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Abstract
This paper presents a simple model of imperfect labor markets with endogenous
labor market participation and home production. Labor market imperfections take
the form of an irreversible entry cost incurred by workers which drives a wedge be-
tween the entry into the labor market and exit from the labor market. Labour force
participation is thus described by two margins. This simple framework brings several
results. First, it delivers an expression for the employment rate and as side-products,
a measure of the unemployment rate and the size of the labour force. Second, it distin-
guishes between two types of non-employed workers: people without a job but willing
to work at the equilibrium wage and people not willing to work. Third, it derives
endogenously all flows between three labour market states. Fourth, a calibration of the
model rationalizes diﬀerences in employment rates across selected countries by diﬀer-
ences in the market productivity premium and the size of market frictions. Finally, the
model is a very simple reduced form of search models with which it is fully consistent:
the irreversible entry cost is the opportunity cost of search and depends on aggregate
conditions.
∗First version. Paper to be presented at the UQAM-CIRPEE conference on Labor Market Frictions
and Macroeconomic Dynamics on October 3rd and 4th 2003. We thank Giuseppe Bertola for insightful
discussions.
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1 Introduction
Macroeconomic analysis has developed a large number of models of equilibrium unemploy-
ment (Phelps, 1995; Mc Donald-Solow, 1981; Shapiro-Stiglitz, 1984; Blanchard-Kiyotaki,
1987; Mortensen-Pissarides, 1994) which successfully account for cross-country diﬀerences in
the ratio of unemployed workers to the labor force. None of these models have explicitly in-
troduced endogenous participation into the analysis. As a result, we lack a good benchmark
to analyze equilibrium employment to population rates, except the frictionless, neo-classical
labor supply model, which is also a basis for most empirical analysis of labor supply.
Yet, cross-country diﬀerences in employment rates are very large, ranging in 2002 from
55% of the 15-64 population in Italy to 63% in France, 71.5% in the United Kingdom and
76% in the US. Further, cross-country diﬀerences in unemployment rates cannot account for
such diﬀerences, mostly due to diﬀerent participation behavior. Some have analyzed these
cross-country diﬀerences within the context of the neo-classical labor market model1, but
market imperfections are diﬃcult to ignore when discussing low employment in European
countries, where the mean duration of unemployment is about or above one year.
Our paper is an attempt to account for the wide cross-country diﬀerences in employment
rates with imperfections in labor markets driving the participation strategies of workers. A
general diﬃculty in this task is that the working age population is partitioned into diﬀerent
categories for which frontiers are not always precisely defined. There is a well defined popu-
lation who have a job in the labor market, a well defined population that do not work in a
formal market and do not want to work in the labor market, and there is a third category of
individuals that would want a job at the market wage but don’t have one. In the latter cate-
gory, which can be called extended unemployment, one finds both individuals actively seeking
for a job which broadly corresponds to the ILO definition of unemployment2, and individuals
that do not search for a job but, if they had one, would accept it. The latter correspond to
a sizeable group that Jones and Riddel (1999) call marginally attached to the labor market.
This studies and others3 indicate that labor force participation and attachment to the labor
market are diﬃcult to observe and to define.
In this paper we present a simple model of the labor market with both market imper-
fections and home production.4 Home production (or equivalently, the utility from being
1See Prescott (2002) for France-US diﬀerences.
2In addition, the definition requires worker to be immediately available for a job and have not been
employed during the week of the survey.
3In earlier insightful studies, Sorrentino (1993 and 1995) has measured these diﬀerent notions of unem-
ployment across countries and revealed important diﬀerences in rates according to the definition chosen.
4Following the seminal paper of Becker (1988), the time allocation problem of core macroeconomics
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at home) diﬀers across individuals and evolves stochastically in time, which drives decisions
to participate. Labour market imperfections diﬀer from conventional studies: they are not
based on market power of workers driving wages above the reservation wage, nor they are
not based on asymmetries of information. They are instead modelled in the spirit of search
models, as an irreversible entry cost paid by workers upon their entry into the labor market.
This drives a wedge between the entry into the labour market and exit from the market, so
that labour force participation is described by two margins.5
Our results are as follows. First, we reach our primary objective, the derivation of an
expression for the employment rate, with as side-products a measure of the extended un-
employment rate and the size of the labour force. Second, the paper distinguishes between
two types of non-employed workers: people without a job but willing to work at the equilib-
rium wage, and people without a job that are not willing to work, in a way consistent with
the work of Jones and Riddel (1999). Third, we derive endogenously all flows between the
employment, extended unemployment and out of the labour force. Fourth, we show that a
calibration of the model can rationalize diﬀerences in employment rate between France and
the United States, with a market productivity that is 40 percent higher than average home
productivity in the United States, while it is roughly comparable in France. Our calibration
also indicates that market frictions are equal to 1.6 month of market output in France, while
they are roughly equal to a month of output in the United States. Finally, we show that
labour market search is fully consistent with our irreversible entry costs.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 proposes a baseline model of market frictions,
home production and endogenous market participation. Section 3 derives the reservation
strategies of workers, the participation margins and the stock and flows in the labour market.
Section 4 uses the model to account for cross-country diﬀerences in employment and non-
participation. Section 5 discusses other implications of the model, notably dual labor market
theory and the links to search theory. Section 6 concludes.
2 Set-up
2.1 Home and market production
We assume that a mass one of individual derives utility from home production and market
production. Individuals have a unit of time to be spent in market and home production.
considers both the time to be spent in the market and the time to be spent in household production.
5The paper thus introduces the theory of irreversible investment (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) to the analysis
of the supply side of labor markets.
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Capital markets are perfect and utility is linear in consumption. In utility terms, market
production and home production are perfect substitute, so that individuals specialize in the
activity in which they have an absolute advantage. Hours spent in the labor market are
indivisible, and, for analytical simplicity, we normalize them to 1, so that market production
is a full time activity.6 Individuals take as given the wage for a full day in the market, and
we indicate such wage with w. A job is a productive opportunity at the individual level that
can be destroyed at rate δ, where δ is the arrival rate of a Poisson process, so that a job
lasts on average 1/δ periods. Utility from home production or equivalently productivity at
home is heterogenous and stochastic and its value changes according to a Poisson at rate λ.
A full day in home production yields a per period utility equal to x, where x is drawn from
a continuous cumulative distribution F (x) defined over the support Ω = [xmin, xmax].
Workers decide how much time to spend in market and home production. Since the time
spent in market production is indivisible, the model is an extensive margin model. In absence
of frictions in the market the model is trivial and the participation decision is described by a
single reservation value x∗, so that all individuals with home production below x∗ participate
full time in market activity.
In reality, information on the location and the availability of jobs is not perfect, and the
process of information gathering is akin to paying an irreversible cost. In what follows, we
assume that each time an individual enters the labor market or gets a new job, he or she
must pay a an irreversible cost equal to C. As we will show in section 5.1, a traditional
matching model with time consuming search, in the spirit of the work of Pissarides (1985)
and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), is identical to assuming that obtaining a job requires
an irreversible entry cost.
2.2 Value functions
Let us indicate by H the value function for being full time in home production and with W
the value function for being full time in market production. Formally, the value function of
being in market activity reads
rW (x) = w+δ[Max[W (x)−C;H(x)]−W (x)]+λ
·Z
Max[W (z),H(z)]dF (z)−W (x)
¸
(1)
where r is the pure rate of time preferences. The equation has a standard asset value
interpretation. The value of having a job is equal to the wage w plus two capital gain terms,
6It is easy to check that none of the properties of the model is aﬀected when workers can produce (1−hw)x
units of home production when they work hw inelastically supplied hours inthe market. We thus chose the
simplest exposition with hw = 1.
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each of them representing a participation decision from the worker stand-point. When a job
is destroyed at rate δ, a worker has to choose whether going to home production or getting
a new job. In the latter case, it is necessary to pay again the entry cost C.7 When the home
productivity changes at rate λ, the worker will get a new draw from the distribution F ,
and will choose whether at the new home productivity value continuing on the same job is
optimal vis-a-vis switching to full time home production. Note that in the latter case there
is no fixed cost to be paid. Similarly, the value of being full time in home production reads
rH(x) = x+ λ
·Z
Max[W (z)− C, H(z)]dF (z)−H(x)
¸
(2)
where the right and side features a dividend equal to x and an expected capital gain condi-
tional upon drawing a new home productivity value at rate λ. In the latter case, the worker
has to decide whether labour market participation is optimal.
2.3 Labor supply and reservation strategies
The existence of the irreversible cost C induces a separation of the entry and exit deci-
sions. We now show that the maximization problem is solved by two reservation strategies,
represented by two cut-oﬀ points xν and xq, defined as
W (xν)−H(xν) = C = S(xν) (3)
W (xq)−H(xq) = 0 = S(xq) (4)
where xν is the entry cut-oﬀ point and xq is the exit cut-oﬀ point, and S(x) =W (x)−H(x).
The quantity S(x) is the surplus from employment for a worker at home productivity x.
Using the diﬀerence of equations (1) and (2) and after a few step of algebra, the surplus can
be written as
(r + δ + λ)S(x) = w − x+ δMax[S(x)− C; 0] (5)
+ λ
Z
Max[S(x0), 0]dF (x0)− λ
Z
Max[S(x0)− C, 0]dF (x0)
Equation (5) is piece-wise linear in x and satisfies the reservation property (see Appendix
for details).
7This assumption is not essential but simplifies a bit one of the expressions for the participation margins,
and makes the interpretation of C easier in terms of search costs (Section 5.3).
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2.4 Labor demand
The entry and the exit margins summarize the labour supply dimension of the model, and
characterize the market behavior given the wage rate w. To close the model, we need to
specify labour demand and derive the wage. In what follows we assume that a job is a
productive asset and that there is a potentially large population of entrepreneurs. Denoting
by q the quit rate of employed workers faced by employers, the present discounted value of
a filled job is
J =
y − w
r + δ + q
where y is the value of the labour product and w is the wage rate. Note that a job is
discounted at rate r+δ+q since jobs are hit by destruction shock at rate δ and are similarly
dissolved by endogenous quit at rate q, the value of which is determined later on. We assume
that firms compete à-la-Bertrand for workers and that there is free entry of firms in the
labour market. Since there is a potentially large population of entrepreneurs, free entry of
firms in the labour market implies that a job must have zero value in equilibrium so that
J ≡ 0 and the corresponding wage is
w∗ = y. (6)
Note that in this setting it is not important whether the realization of the home productivity
shock x is observable to the firm.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Entry and quit margins
Equations (3) and (4) provide an expression for the entry margin and the quit margin, as
well as a system solving for the cut-oﬀ points. See the appendix for details. This system is
xq − xν
r + λ+ δ
= C (Entry)
xq = y +
λ
r + λ+ δ
Z xq
xν
F (z)dz (Quit)
The two margins deserve several comments. The entry margin says that the surplus from
the job at xν is identical to the entry cost. The quit margin states that home productivity
of the marginal worker is equal to the market wage (w∗ = y) plus a positive term, which is
a participation hoarding eﬀect. Indeed, workers hold on to existing jobs as a way to save on
future cost C if home productivity were to fall. This eﬀect generates attachment to the labor
market, in the sense that workers quit less than they would do in the absence of entry cost.
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Figure 1: Quit Margin, Entry Margin and Equilibrium Cut-Oﬀ Points.
Further notice that as the entry cost disappears, i.e. when C → 0, the entry and the
quit cut-oﬀ points converge to each other. Thus, the existence of irreversible cost drives a
wedge in the two cut-oﬀ points. The partial equilibrium is derived in observing that the quit
margin is downward sloping in a (xν, xq) space while the entry margin is upward sloping as
represented in Figure 1.
The entry margin is shifted down by higher C, r, δ and λ: entry is discouraged when xν
is lower, i.e. there are fewer participants when entry costs is larger or when the surplus is
lower, i.e. when the discount of turnover rates are larger. The entry curve is upward sloping
because a larger xq means longer duration on the job, and thus larger surplus.
The quit margin is downward sloping because the hoarding eﬀect is lower, the closer xν
from xq. In the limit λ = 0, the quit margin in horizontal and xq = w. Overall, the quit
cut-oﬀ point xq coincides with wage when λ = 0 or when C = 0. The quit margin is shifted
up by higher wage w and higher λ and reduced by higher λ and δ: the marginal worker
is more conservative in quitting (higher xq) the higher the market wage and the hoarding
eﬀect, generated by anticipation of a frequent change in λ and less impatience r + δ.
3.2 Allocation of workers
An interesting feature of the model is that y shifts the quit curve up but does not aﬀect the
entry curve, while C shifts the entry curve up but leaves the quit curve unchanged. As a
result, the cut-oﬀ points determining the allocation of workers in home or market activity are
both a function of y and C. We think of y and C as been driven by individual characteristics
and aggregate conditions. Notably, y is primarily driven by the skill level of the individual,
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while C can be thought as a good proxy for the job finding rate, i.e. a combination of frictions
and aggregate job creations. We come back on this issue in Section 5. Hereafter, although
cut-oﬀ points are functions of individual and aggregate parameters xq(y, C) and xν(y, C), we
neglect to write the arguments for convenience.
Overall, simple comparative statics indicates that
dxq/dy = dxν/dy =
r + λ+ δ
r + δ + p+ q
> 0
dxq/dC > 0; dxν/dC < 0
where p = λF (xν) is the entry rate and q is the quit rate, which can now be determined, i.e.
q = λ(1 − F (xq)). The first line states that participation to the labor market is increased
along both margins when market productivity is larger relative to home productivity. The
second line states that entry costs discourage participation at the entry margins, which is
natural, but also that it discourages exits, through the hoarding eﬀect defined above.
There is a natural representation of the allocation of workers in the space (x, y). When
λ = 0, this implies that p = q = 0, and thus the entry and the quit margin are a straight
lines, as in Figure 2 (the bold straight lines).8 When in addition the entry cost C is zero,
both straight lines converge to the 45 degree line, as in the Roy model. In the general case
λ > 0, the frontiers of Figure 2 are now concave in (x, y) which is represented with the
thinner curves.9
3.3 Stocks
People in the working age population either have a job or not. If they have a job, they can
be in two situations in case of exogenous job destruction; they may want to pay the entry
cost to get a new job, in which case they are said to be attached. Or they may not get a new
job, and they are said to be unattached.
We denote by Ea the number of attached employed and by Ena the number of non-
attached employed. Attached employed are those individuals with market production below
xν while non-attached are those with a job and home productivity between xν and xq. Upon
8The figure shows that our model can be seen as an extension of the Roy-model with irreversible entry
costs. See Sattinger (2003) for a related extension: he shows that, with serach frictions in the two Roy-
sectors, the frontier diverges to two, delimiting space in three parts, one in which workers search in only one
sector, one in which they only search in the other, and a third one in which they share time in search in
each sector. In our setup, there is no search friction in production of x. This asymetry across sectors changes
drastically the interpretations of the model compared to Sattinger.
9This can be seen in remarking that d(p+q)/dy = λdxq/dy(F (xν)−F (xq)) < 0, so that dxq/dy calculated
above is now increasing with y.
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Figure 2:
losing a job, the unattached are said to be in ’extended unemployed’ (they have a value of x
between xν and xq) and their number is denoted by Σ, while non-employed with x > xq are
said to be pure non- employed. N is the number of pure non-employed workers. Overall, we
have four diﬀerent states, linked by the identity
Σ+Ena +Ea +N = 1
We shall indicate with u0 =
δ+q
p+δ+q
the ratio of exits from employment over total turnover.
Recall that q = λ(1−F (xq)) is the quit rate and p = λF (xν) is the entry rate. Denoting by
ρ their complement to λ, such that ρ = λ − p − q = λF (xq) − λF (xν), we obtain the four
stocks (detailed in appendix)
N = 1− F (xq) = q/λ (7)
Ea = F (x
ν) = p/λ (8)
Ena = (1− u0)ρ/λ (9)
Σ = u0ρ/λ (10)
Finally, from the attached and non attached employment we get a simple analytical expres-
sion for the employment rate
E = Ea +Ena = (1− uo)(1 + δ/λ)
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which depends on the endogenous variables (xq, xν) and the full set of parameters of the
model. Note that in the case δ = 0, we have E = 1− u0 = p/(p+ q). Finally, one can easily
show that total employment increases with the market productivity (dE/dy > 0), while non
employment decreases with market productivity dN/dy < 0, and increases with the entry
cost (dN/dC > 0) Other comparative statics are displayed in appendix.
Having derived the stock, we can define the equilibrium of the model. The equilibrium
is a n-ple of 3 endogenous variables (xν, xq, w) determined by
• a quit margin in equation (4);
• a entry margin in equation (3);
• a free entry equation (6)
and 4 stocks (N,Ea, Ena,Σ) derived from the two participation margins in a steady-state
3.4 Flows
The flows of workers per unit of time between the three states employment, extended unem-
ployment and non-participation can be derived in counting the number of transitions of x
into the diﬀerent intervals [xmin, xν], [xν , xq] and [xq, xmax]. These transitions are respectively
at rate p, ρ = λ−p−q and q multiplied by the origin population. We can derive the following
matrix of flows per unit of time between E, Σ and N :


− E → Σ E → N
Σ→ E − Σ→ N
N → E N → Σ −

 =


− Enaδ Eq
Σp − Σq
Np Nρ −


=


− δ(1− u0)(ρ/λ) (δ + λ)(1− u0)(q/λ)
pu0(ρ/λ) − qu0(ρ/λ)
p(q/λ) q(ρ/λ) −


where in the second matrix of the first line the origin population is indicated in symbols,
while in the latter matrix we substitute the endogenous value of the stocks described in
equations (7), (8), (9) and (10). Note that in addition, the attached employed workers who
lose their job at rate δ could be considered as additional transitions. Notably, if they had to
search for a job during an infinity small unit if time, Σ would thus include such frictional
unemployment and thus one would need to add-up a number Eaδ = pδ/λ of workers to the
inflows into Σ. The same is true for the outflows from Σ to employment.
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Table 1: Employment and Extended Unemployment in France and United States, 1996-2000
France United
States
Conventional Definition
Employment Rate 0.598 0.730
Unemployment to Working Age a 0.075 0.034
Non participation to Working Age 0.326 0.235
Adjusted Definition
Employment Rate 0.598 0.730
Extended Unemployment b 0.093 0.048
Pure Non Employed c 0.308 0.221
a Sto ck of Unemployed (ILO deifn ition based) w ith Resp ect to Total 15-64 Working age Population;
Definition U-7 in Sorrentino (1993) for France, and U-7 for the United States
corrected for part-tim e.
Averages 1996-2000
Source: Authors’ ca lculation, and OECD .
4 Quantitative exercise
4.1 Cross-country diﬀerences
Cross country diﬀerences in the employment rate are very large. In this section, we confine
our analysis to diﬀerences between France and the United States, two countries that are
often used for quantitative comparisons between Europe and the United States. In the
United States, between 1996 and 2000, 73 percent of the working age population (defined
with respect to the 15-64 population) was employed. In France, during the same period,
the employment rate was 59.8 percent, with a diﬀerence between the two countries of more
than 14 percentage points (Table 1). The share of the working age population that is
non-employed is conventionally divided into unemployed and non participants, where the
distinction is based on the ILO definition of unemployment, which requires that individuals
do not have a job, are actively seeking for one, and are immediately available to start working.
Unemployment is 7.5 percent of the working age population in France, while it is 3.4 percent
in the United States. This suggests that only a third of the diﬀerences in employment rate
across the two countries is accounted for by the diﬀerences in ILO unemployment, with the
other two third is accounted for by diﬀerences in non participation rate.
In the second part of Table 1, we report the statistics for extended unemployed, a concept
of unemployment that is broader than the ILO definition, since it includes all individuals
that do not have a job but would like to work. Several scholars, and notably Sorrentino
and Jones and Riddel (1999) have shown the existence of a significant number of such
individuals in labor force surveys. In two very insightful papers, Sorrentino (1993 and 1995)
has established several definitions of unemployment, ranking from 1 (the most conservative)
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to 7 (the broadest one), on the basis of answers of respondents to individual surveys such as
their willingness to have a job, the desired number of hours and the duration of the current
unemployed spell. The ILO definition corresponds to definition 4, while definition 5 includes
part-timers reporting the desire to be full-time and definition 6 additionally includes workers
reporting wanting a job but not searching for the job. Sorrentino showed that the discrepancy
between rates are substantial, especially in countries such as Italy and Japan. More recently,
Jones and Riddel (1999) have shown that in Canada a large fraction of non-employed people
would like to work but does not search, and that an unemployment statistics that considers
such individuals would be 25 percent larger. In other words, ignoring the issue of part-time
(this would imply that we ignore the distinction between U4 and U5), the Canadian rate of
extended unemployment U6 would be larger than the ILO rate U4 by 25%. Jones and Ridell
qualify these workers of marginally attached to the labor market.
Using the estimates of Sorrentino (1993), ignoring the issue of part-time, extended un-
employment in the United States is 40 percent larger than the conventional definition, while
in France is 20 percent larger. For estimating extended unemployment in the late nineties,
we assume that the ratio between extended and conventional unemployment in 1989 is the
same as those prevailing in the late part of the nineties. As a result, extended unemployment
divided by working age population rise to 5 percent in the United states, and to more than
9 percent in France, even though the diﬀerences in the employment rate between the two
countries are still accounted for by diﬀerences in the share of non employed.
4.2 Calibration
In this section we quantitatively account for the diﬀerences in the employment rates and
non-participation rates between France and the United States, using the simple model pre-
sented in the previous sections. The spirit of the exercise is to find parameter values for
market productivity and market imperfections so that the model matches the labor mar-
ket statistics presented in Table 1. In other words, we ask how large must be the average
market productivity premium and the market frictions for obtaining the aggregate outcome
described in Table 1
Throughout the simulation we set the pure monthly discount rate to 0.005, and the two
turnover statistics λ and δ to 0.15 and 0.09 (Table 2). The distribution is exponential with
parameter (and mean) B = 1, so that the only remaining parameters are y and C. We let
the routine searching for values of C and y so as to match for the United States (France) an
employment rate of 73 (59.8) percent and a pure non employment rate of 22.1 (30.8) percent.
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The results are as follows. Market productivity in the United States is calibrated as being 40
percent larger than the average home productivity in the population, and market frictions
are set to about a month of market output. Turning to France, our results show that market
productivity is roughly equal to average home productivity, while market frictions correspond
to 1.6 months of output. These results suggest that institutional settings (such as taxes or
transfers to non-participating workers) in the two countries are potentially responsible for
huge diﬀerences in the market productivity premium. Finally, if we compare the calibrated
market productivity between France and the United States, our exercise shows that there is
a diﬀerent in market productivity per worker of 30 percent, exactly as argued by Prescott
(2002)
Table 2: Calibration to the US and French Labor Markets
Parameters Notation United States France
Common Parameters
Discount Rate r 0.005 0.005
Idiosyncratic Shock Rate λ 0.15 0.15
Separation Rate δ 0.09 0.09
Distribution a B 1.00 1.00
Code Determined Parameters
Market Productivity y 1.36 1.03
Market Frictions C 1.40 1.62
Equilibrium Values
Entry Margin xν 1.17 0.78
F (xν) 0.69 0.54
Quit Margin xq 1.51 1.18
F (xq) 0.78 0.69
Calibrated Statistics
Employment Rate E 73.00 59.80
Pure Non employment rate N 22.10 30.80
Extended Unemployment Σ 4.90 9.40
(a), Distribution is Negative Exponentia l w ith param eter B
Source: Authors’ ca lcu lation
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5 Applications/extensions
5.1 Search theory and unemployment
In our model, the individuals in the working age population that do not have a job but
would like to work are those individuals without a job but with home productivity inside
the interval [xν , xq]. If these individuals had a job at market productivity y, they would
accept it, but they are not ready to pay the irreversible entry cost C. As we argued above,
our theoretical analysis is thus capturing an important aspect of labor markets, as the work
of Sorrentino and Jones and Riddel show that there is a significant number of such workers
in labor force surveys. At the same time, we are leaving aside the distinction between the
ILO unemployed and the ’marginally attached’ workers. This distinction is not crucial to
determine the employment rate and the non-participation rate, as we argued above, but is
useful to keep a clear view of the labor market. We now filled this gap.
In this section we develop further the concept of entry cost. We argue that the cost C is
only a convenient short-cut for imperfect labor markets that can easily be interpreted it in
terms of search theory. Assume that there is a new state, denoted by U , which is a situation
in which workers search for a job. Search is time consuming and it is only randomly that
workers obtain a job, at a rate p. One can thus introduce the value of not-searching, which
is denoted by eH whereeindicates that the derivation of Bellman equations is diﬀerent from
the benchmark model derived in Sections 2 and 3. Similarly, fW will be the value of having
a job. For simplicity, we assume that search takes s units of time and thus diverts sx units
of home production.
The three value functions read
(r + λ)W˜ (x) = y + λ
Z
Max[W (x0), U(x0), H(x0)]dF (x0) + δ[Max[U(x), H(x)]−W (x)](11)
(r + λ)U(x) = (1− s)x+ p[W (x)− U(x)] + λ
Z
Max[U(x0),H(x0)]dF (x0) (12)
(r + λ)H˜(x) = x+ λ
Z
Max[U(x0),H(x0)]dF (x0) (13)
The surplus from the job is now defined by the equation S(x) =W (x)−Max[U(x),H(x)]
where the max operator indicates that the outside option for the worker is either searching
for another job or going full-time to home-production. We can easily see that participation
decisions along the quit margin, in such a world, are still described by equating the value of
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holding a job and the value of not-searching, i.e.
fW (xq)− eH(xq) = 0
U(xν)− eH(xν) = 0
The first equation is formally equivalent to (4). Now, the entry margin can be rewritten asfW (xν) − eH(xν) = fW (xν) − U(xν). By diﬀerence of (11) and (12) evaluated at x = xν , we
have
sxν = p[W˜ (xν)− U(xν)]
stating that the opportunity cost of search in terms of home production is compensated for
the marginally participating worker to the expected return from search. Plugging it into the
entry margin, we obtain fW (xν)− eH(xν) = sxν/p
which indicates that the entry cost of Section 2 and 3 is C = sxν/p, i.e. equal to the expected
value of forgone home productivity during search. Solving for the two margins, we obtain
xq = y +
λ(1− s)
r + λ+ δ + p
Z xν
xmin
F (x)dx+
λ
r + λ+ δ
Z xq
xν
F (x)dx (14)
xq − xν
r + λ+ δ
=
sxν
p
(15)
In the space (xν , xq) one can see that the slopes of the margins are the same as in Section 3,
the quit margin being even exactly identical when s = 1.
Overall, these results show that the time spent searching is an irreversible entry cost into
employment. Furthermore, as the job finding rate goes to infinity, the irreversible entry cost
goes to zero.
5.2 Alternative wage determination
The spirit of most models of equilibrium unemployment is to have a nominal or real rigidity on
prices or wages. In contrast, our model, focussing onmarket participation and unemployment,
shows that one does not require such rigidities to obtain a non-trivial employment rate: a
competitive wage equal to marginal productivity is suﬃcient here. One might however
wonder the impact of an alternative wage determination process. In short, when wages are
bargained over the total surplus with the employer, the two fundamental equations of the
model are very similar. We can show, when 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 is an index of the bargaining power
16
of workers, that we obtain still obtain the quit margin, and the following modified entry
margin:
xq = y +
λ
r + λ+ δ
Z xq
xν
F (x)dx
β
xq − xν
r + λ+ δ
= C
In Garibaldi and Wasmer (2003), we also show that the search extension to the model
yields similar results: C is still equal to sxν
p
in the above entry margin, while the first
integral in equation (15) has to be inserted in the quit margin, slightly modified as follows:
λ(1−s)
r+λ+δ+βp
R xν
xmin
F (x)dx.
5.3 Dual labor markets
Diﬀerences in turnover and attachment to the labor market is one of the main distinctive fea-
tures of primary and secondary workers in dual labor market theory developed in Doeringer
and Piore (1971) and Bulow and Summers (1986). In our model, workers with diﬀerent value
of x have diﬀerent turnover rate in and out of the labor force. Attached employed workers
quit a job and leave the labor market at rate q = λ(1 − F (xq)): in case of a δ-shock, they
remain in the labor market and immediately obtain a new job. On the contrary, unattached
employed workers leave the labor market at rate δ + q > q. One can thus identify the at-
tached workers to primary workers and unattached to secondary workers, who further face
unemployment from time to time at rate δ.
Dual labor market theory is also based on heterogeneity in market productivity. In our
model, assume that there are two classes of workers, one with low y, one with high y, featuring
diﬀerences in human capital or training. Then, even though these workers have an identical
distribution and frequency of shocks of x, the fact that dxq/dy > 0 and dxν/dy > 0, implies
that high productivity workers quit less and overall participate more to the labor market
than low productivity workers. Now suppose that y is so large that xq is above xmax. In this
case, workers never quit the labor market. If in addition, xν > xmin, then in a steady-state,
all workers become employed and none of them are unattached.
5.4 Stochastic heterogeneity in both home and market production
We now assume that market productivity is also heterogenous and stochastic. Specifically,
we assume that an individual is described by a couple x, y where y is market productivity
and x is home productivity. While there is a density function q(x, y) in what follows we
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are mainly interested in the marginal distributions G(y|x) and F (x|y) that we assume to be
continuous with no point mass. We assume that the market productivity y changes at rate
δ and draws a value from G(y|x). Similarly, home productivity changes at rate λ and its
value is drawn from the cumulative F (x|y). Shocks to market productivity are independent.
It follows that the position of an individual is now described by a couple x, y and that the
two value functions read
(r + λ+ δ)W (x, y) = y + δ
Z
Max[W (x, y0),H(x, y0)]dG(y0|x)
+λ
Z
Max[W (x0, y),H(x0, y)]dF (x0|y)
(r + λ+ δ)H(x, y) = x+ δ
Z
Max[W (x, y0)− C,H(x, y0)]dG(y0|x)
+λ
Z
Max[W (x0, y)− C,H(x0, y)]dF (x0|y)
The surplus from market participation for a (x, y) individual is still defined as S(x, y) =
W (x, y) − H(x, y). One can define two frontiers in the space (x, y): the quit frontier is
described equivalently by xq(y) or yq(x) and the entry frontier is described equivalently by
xν(y) or yν(x), with
S[xq(y), y] = S[x, yq(x)] = 0
S[xν(y), y] = S[x, yν(x)] = C
Under some conditions (INCOMPLETE, to be done), one can preserve the reservation prop-
erty and show that this extension is formally equivalent to the previous model, so that the
main intuition captured by Figure 2 is preserved here. The derivation of stocks is however
more complex.
5.5 Aggregate fluctuations
Mc Donald and Solow (1981) claimed that a good model of unemployment must explain
why employment fluctuates while wages remain fix. Taking the second part as given, we can
exploit further the search extension above to claim that a source of employment fluctuations
lies in variations in C: in fact, in the spirit of matching models, when job creation is reduced,
non-employed workers willing a job face longer spells of unemployment. This reduction in
the job finding rate p implies an increase in the opportunity cost of search, i.e. a rise in C.
Future works should aim at investigating the dynamics of an economy where the source of
business cycles is jointly determined by aggregate fluctuations in both y and C.
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6 Conclusion
We have developed a simple model of equilibrium employment in imperfect labor markets
and discussed a) its ability to account for cross-country diﬀerences ; b) its implications to
labor market analysis and notably its potential to understand the subtle distinctions between
unemployment and non-participation ; and c) its links to search theory and dual labor market
theory.
Future work should aim at introducing individual heterogeneity in market productivity
and account for aggregate fluctuations and macroeconomic dynamics.
7 APPENDIX
7.1 Entry and quit
The two Bellman equations can be written as
(r + δ + λ)W (x) = w + δMax[W (x)− C;H(x)] + λ
Z
Max[W (z),H(z)]dF (z)
(r + λ)H(x) = x+ λ
Z
Max[W (z)− C,H(z)]dF (z)
Further adding and subtracting δH(x) and λ
R
H(z)dF (z) from the first equation and λ
R
H(z)dF (z)
from the second equation we obtain
(r + δ + λ)W (x) = w + δH(x) + δMax[S(x)− C; 0] + λ
Z
Max[S(z), 0]dF (z) + λ
Z
H(z)dF (z)
(r + λ)H(x) = x+ λ
Z
Max[S(z)− C, 0]dF (z) + λ
Z
H(z)dF (z)
so that
(r+δ+λ)S(x) = w−x+δMax[S(x)−C; 0]+λ
Z
Max[S(z), 0]dF (z)−λ
Z
Max[S(z)−C, 0]dF (z)
from which it is immediate to see that the function is piecewise continuous and satisfies the reser-
vation property. Further, the monotonic slope of the surplus functions are
S0(x) = − 1
r + λ
x < xν
S0(x) = − 1
r + λ+ δ
x > xν
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This shows that the surplus function is continuous and that reservation strategies exists. This
implies that Z
Max[S(z), 0]dF (z) =
Z xν
xmin
S(z)dF (z) +
Z xq
xν
S(z)dF (z)Z
Max[S(z)− C, 0]dF (z) =
Z xν
xmin
S(z)dF (z)− CF (xν)
so that the surplus simplifies to
(r + δ + λ)S(x) = w − x+ δMax[S(x)− C; 0] + λ
Z xq
xν
S(z)dF (z) + λCF (xν)
Further, an integration by part leads toZ xq
xν
S(z)dF (z) = −S(xν)F (xν) + 1
r + λ+ δ
Z xq
xν
F (z)dz
so that
(r + δ + λ)S(x) = w − x+ δMax[S(x)− C; 0] + λ
r + λ+ δ
Z xq
xν
F (z)dz
It is then easy to obtain the quit margin using S(xq) = 0 in the expression above, while the entry
margin is obtained combining S(x) = x
q−x
r+λ+δ
and S(xν) = C.
7.2 Stocks
Proof: equations (7) and (8) are derived from the definition of the density of x. Further, we have
Σ+Ena = F (x
q)− F (xν) (16)
One then uses the following diﬀerential equation for the unemployment people
∂Σ/∂t = δEna + (λ− p− q)N − (p+ q)Σ
= 0 in a steady-state
which yields equation (9), in adding (p+ q)Ena on both sides and replacing Ena +Σ by equation
(16) to . Equation (10) then comes straightforward.
7.3 Comparative statics
Diﬀerentiating (Entry) and (Quit), we have
dxq − dxν = dC(r + λ+ δ)
dxq = dy +
(λ− q)dxq − pdxν
r + λ+ δ
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Introducing Λ = r+λ+δ
r+δ+p+q
> 0, we have
dxq
dy
=
dxν
dy
= Λ
dxq
dC = pΛ;
dxν
dC = −(r + δ + q)Λ
From (7) to (10), we have
dN = −λf(xq)dxq
dΣ = du0[1− (p+ q)/λ] + u0 [f(xq)dxq − f(xν)dxν]
dE = −du0
du0 =
pdq − (δ + q)dp
(δ + p+ q)2
= −λ [pf(x
q)dxq + (δ + q)f(xν)dxν]
(δ + p+ q)2
Thus,
dN/dy < 0; dN/dC < 0
du0/dy < 0; du0/dC ≶ 0
dE/dy > 0; dE/dC ≶ 0
dΣ/dy ≶ 0; dΣ/dC ≶ 0
with unresolved ambiguities.
7.4 The Surplus Function with Double Heterogeneity
When the productivity of an individual is described by a couple x, y and the two value functions
read
(r + λ+ δ)W (x, y) = y + δ
Z
Max[W (x, y0),H(x, y0)]dG(y0|x)
+λ
Z
Max[W (x0, y),H(x0, y)]dF (x0|y)
(r + λ+ δ)H(x, y) = x+ δ
Z
Max[W (x, y0)− C,H(x, y0)]dG(y0|x)
+λ
Z
Max[W (x0, y)− C,H(x0, y)]dF (x0|y)
The surplus from market participation for a x, y individual is S(x, y) = W (x, y) − H(x, y).
Summing up the two previous value functions and adding and subtracting δ
R
H(x, y0)dG(y0|x),
λ
R
H(x0, y)dF (x0|y), δ R H(x, y0)dG(y0|x), λ R H(x0, y)]dF (x0|y) the surplus function read
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(r + λ+ δ)S(x, y) = y − x+ δ
Z
Max[S(x, y0), 0]dG(y0|x) + λ
Z
Max[S(x0, y), 0]dF (x0|y)
(17)
−δ
Z
Max[S(x, y0)− C, 0]dG(y0|x)− λ
Z
Max[S(x0, y)− C, 0]dF (x0|y)
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